

NAPOLEON III. AND HIS REIGN.

THERE is a tendency in physical nature, if it is not a law, to condense force in some one of a family to the detriment of its other members. How seldom two of the same name become illustrious in letters, statesmanship, or military glory! If, however, we sometimes find two of the same family sharing the same gifts, one will be found to be but an echo or a reflection of the other. There are not two Homers, nor two Shaksperes, nor two Newtons, nor two Ciceros, and, in the sense in which we write, are we not justified in saying that there have not been two Bonapartes? There is, indeed, a whole family of the name which still counts its members by the dozen and its ramifications by the score, but in the light of recent history the fact is evident that only one of them was gifted in an extraordinary manner. The Corsican who rose from the post of minor officer in the French army by the force of his own talents to be the tamer of the revolution, the conqueror of Europe, the Emperor of France, and its lawgiver even to the present time, left no Eliseus behind him to wear his mantle or share his greatness. Nor should it be overlooked that the genius of the first Napoleon is not so apparent in the battles that he won as in the code of laws which he framed and bequeathed to France. The "Code Napoléon," written with the clearness of Cæsar and the pith of Tacitus, places its author in a rank higher than that of Lycurgus or Solon, or even of Charlemagne. The vices of the man as told us in authentic history, his private failings as portrayed in the somewhat prejudiced pages of Rémusat, will never make men forget the spirit of equity which breathes through this Code, nor cease to admire the greatness of the restorer of public order in France, the victor of Austerlitz, and the founder of new dynasties all over Europe—dynasties which failed everywhere, because, although many bore the name, only one possessed the genius of Napoleon. This fact is well illustrated in the history of the last of the name who held the sceptre of his uncle. Those who had looked at the outside only of things during the twenty years' reign of the last of the Napoleons, and judged him by the material prosperity of France, the embellishment of its capital, the respectful fear of other nations and the homage of their monarchs, the military success of the Crimean and Italian wars, and the annexation of Savoy, were dis-

posed to think that the nephew, although not the military peer of his uncle, was his equal in statesmanship and his superior in diplomacy, and that the glory of the Napoleonic dynasty had risen from the tomb at the Invalides for a second apotheosis. But now, after the disgraceful surrender at Sedan, the invasion of France and capture of Paris by the countrymen of Blücher, guided by the son of Queen Louise; after the fall of the dynasty and the revelation of its secret history, its vices and its weakness, we are forced to conclude that the nephew was but a caricature of his uncle—in short, a "*Badinguet*," as the audiences in the French theatres wittily nicknamed him.

Charles Louis Napoleon, or Napoleon III., was born in Paris April 20, 1808, and died at Chiselhurst, in England, January 9, 1873. He was the son of Louis Bonaparte, for a time King of Holland, third brother of the great emperor, and of Hortense de Beauharnais, daughter of Josephine. Charles Louis received a good education under the care of a mother who, whatever other faults she may have had, was certainly not lacking on the score of devotion to her children. His early life was one of wild and often foolish adventure. In 1836 at Strasbourg, and in 1840 at Boulogne, where he displayed a tame eagle as the symbol of his dynasty, he made ridiculous attempts to overthrow the government of Louis Philippe. After a novitiate spent in insurrection, conspiracy, travel, and jail, he was elected a member of the French Assembly in 1848, and chosen president of the republic for four years on December 10 of the same year. On December 2, 1851, he overthrew the existing government by force, and just one year after, on December 2, 1852, by a successful conspiracy and a violation of his oath, he became Emperor of the French. At the instigation of Jules Favre, on September 4, 1870, after the surrender of the French troops at Sedan, the French Assembly voted his dethronement and the re-establishment of the republic. Thus Napoleon as emperor controlled the destinies of France for almost twenty years, and for eighteen of them his sway was almost despotic. He had the initiative of the law-making power and the unchecked disposition of the army, navy, and finance of the greatest nation in Europe for eighteen years—time enough to mould a full generation of men.

But what is the record which he left? The republic of 1848, conservative for a time, was so disturbed by insurrection of the dangerous classes that good men lived in continual terror of communism and socialism. A licentious press threatened, conspiring clubs menaced, peace, law, order, and religion. Conse-

quently when Napoleon seized the reins of power and repressed the incipient Commune the better-minded men of France and the rest of Europe, although condemning the means employed by him, rejoiced at their consequence; for they hoped that his strong arm would shield property and religion from mob aggression. They were encouraged the more to hope this because the men who surrounded his throne in the beginning were generally able and well disposed to the higher interests of society and to Christianity. Rouher and Troplong were conservatives, and his Spanish wife, Eugénie, was said to be a devout Catholic. Canrobert, Saint-Arnaud, and afterwards Niel and MacMahon, were soldiers of the old school, uncorrupted by the license which at a later date ate the heart out of the discipline of the French army. And so Napoleon, after the *Coup-d'état*, was hailed even by the clergy of France as a new deliverer. Country curates in La Vendée and Brittany, the heart of the Legitimist faction, saluted him as lawful king and met him at the door of their churches with smoking thuribles, as if he were Henry V. himself, while admiring peasants shouted, "*Vive l'Empereur!*" from throats that had always been used to the cry of "*Vive le roi!*" France was at peace. "The empire is peace," said the emperor, and prosperity brightened the hills and valleys of the whole land. In a few years the whole world bowed to France. Her sword drove back the Cossack from the Black Sea and the Austrian from the plains of Lombardy; and her word settled the quarrels of the East and swayed the diplomacy even of England, timorous and distrustful of so great a rival. Cavour and Bismarck, then humble intriguers conspiring for the aggrandizement of their ambitious but intimidated states, bent low to the Cæsar who held in his hands the sword of Brennus which decided the balance into whichever scale it was cast. The French army that had conquered Algiers and relieved Rome was believed to be invincible. Its prestige received a new lustre from the name of Napoleon—of a Napoleon, too, who had shown some evidence in his published works of being a philosopher as well as a strategist, in spite of the reveries scattered through them. Everything went well at first. With such an army, such a navy, so splendid a financial condition, such a system of police as existed in France in 1852, what was there to prevent Napoleon from correcting the false notions of so many Frenchmen in regard to government by improving the education of the young, and by aiding religion in its endeavor to recapture the hearts of the lower classes in French towns and cities, tainted by the infidelity that accompanied the

first Revolution? He had the control of the education of the whole of France, yet he did not correct the infidel tendency of the University, always jealous of Christian schools. Renan, an arch-infidel, was allowed to corrupt young France in the Collège de France until in 1864 public opinion forced his dismissal. The laws against religious orders were not enforced, it is true, as they have been lately under the new republic, but they were not abrogated. Instead of founding Christian schools among the laboring classes, Napoleon thought to convert them by giving them plenty of work at the public expense—feeding them, as it were, at the public crib—and to control them by *mouchards* instead of by religion. He should have prevented public work on Sunday, as he had the power to do; but he feared the secret societies and the Orsini bombs. The laboring classes were trained to infidelity by public sanction. His influence in the church was thrown on the side of Gallicanism—not a Gallicanism of principle, like that of the old Bourbons, but one of sentiment and political expediency. George Darboy was the representative of this new form of Gallicanism, as Bishop of Nancy, and afterwards as Archbishop of Paris, and he received many reproofs from the pope for his trimming between him and Cæsar. Thus did Napoleon fail to improve the moral condition of France while he was adding to its material wealth; thus did he fail to understand that a Christian people loyal in obedience to the Ten Commandments is the only one upon which a ruler can depend for support in his hour of adversity.

If we look at the chief events of his reign we shall perceive this lack of foresight more clearly.

The first great event of his reign was the Crimean War. It is related that Louis Napoleon being at Stuttgart in 1847 a French journalist interviewed him.

“‘What impression do I make in France?’ said the prince.

“‘A bad one, prince.’

“‘Then you think my cause lost?’

“‘Yes, lost!’

“‘You are mistaken, sir. France cannot live without destroying the treaties of 1815 and avenging Waterloo. She knows that I alone will give her satisfaction.’”*

The prince who spoke thus showed the inconsistency of his character when as emperor he became the ally of England and throughout his whole reign the slave of English diplomacy. In

* *Le Dernier des Napoléon*, p. 113.

1852 Russia menaced the interests of English power and commerce in the East. England controlled Turkey politically and financially. Russia, irritated and desirous of extending her own influence in the East, declared war against Turkey in 1854. England alone could not withstand the Cossack; France was necessary, and, through the unfortunate influence of Eugénie, Napoleon became the ally of his uncle's only conqueror, contrary to his own and his country's true interest. The French army, at first decimated by cholera in the Dobruscha swamps, beat Menchikoff at Alma, in the Crimea, saved the English army at Inkermann, and took Sebastopol by storm September 8, 1855, after a long and bloody siege. Peace followed, but what did France gain? The hatred of Russia, in the first place—a great misfortune for Napoleon's mushroom empire. The Russian power was only checked but not broken in the East. Nor did Napoleon know how to keep the friendship of his ally, for he refused to destroy Cronstadt and St. Petersburg. Thus he gained nothing even on the side of England, while through his fault France lost both her soldiers and her money.

An incident that occurred on the occasion of signing the treaty of Paris, after this war, shows clearly the weakness of this imperial dreamer. He was master of the situation. His troops had won the battles of the Crimea. It was in his power to dictate his own terms and to form strong alliances. Russia could not resist, and England dared not. Yet, instead of acting for the future interests of France or of his own dynasty, he was specially occupied with the question of what kind of quill the plenipotentiaries should use in signing the treaty of peace! A feather was pulled from the wing of an eagle in the Jardin des Plantes for the glorious purpose; and the gentleman * who plucked it gave a certificate of authenticity in the following words: "I hereby certify that I myself have plucked this quill from the wing of the imperial eagle." Here we have "Badinguet" and the women of his court, instead of the spirit of the great conqueror of Marengo and Austerlitz.

If the rôle of Napoleon III. in the Crimean War proved him to be the dupe of England, insincere in his words—for he had said that the empire meant peace, just before going to war; and that Waterloo should be avenged, previous to becoming the ally of Wellington's countrymen—his conduct in the war of Italy showed further that he was a poor soldier, affiliated with the secret societies, and the tool of their conspiracies. Louis Napo-

* M. Feuillel de Conches.

leon's true policy would have been to identify himself with the conservative forces in European society. He could not trust the revolution. He ought to have known that it would push him aside, if it ever obtained the upper hand. He should have known that the names of emperor and empire were as distasteful to the secret societies as those of king and kingdom. To placate the opposition of the followers of the old régime, to inspire confidence in the bosom of the conservative classes—this would have been true diplomacy, for on this side alone lay the hope of his dynasty. Pius IX. and his much-abused minister, Antonelli, had repeatedly warned him of the danger of joining in the intrigues of Cavour and the other subalpine conspirators. He had already alienated Russia, the great conservative power of the North. He next alienated Austria, the great conservative power of Germany, by making war on her in the interest of all the Red Republicans in Europe, the sworn enemies of his own throne.

Count Cavour, true disciple of Machiavelli, knew how to manage the hesitating and irresolute Louis Napoleon. Partly intimidated by the attempts at assassination, partly cajoled, and partly from sympathy—for had not some of his youth been spent in attempts at Italian revolution?—the emperor declared war against Austria on April 13, 1859. All Italy was in arms. The cohorts of Mazzini, with whom Napoleon had always held a morганatic relation, brought the knife of the assassin to assist, but to sully, the sword of the gallant French army. The battle of Magenta, won on June 4, 1859, by Marshal MacMahon; and the battle of Solferino, won on the 24th of the same month by Marshal Niel, terminated the campaign. Napoleon took a personal part in the war and manifested absolute incapacity as a soldier. His two brave marshals saved him from complete disaster, and achieved victory where alone he would have experienced defeat. Incompetent as a soldier, he again showed his incompetency as a diplomat. He went to war for the sake of Italy, yet abruptly made a treaty with Austria at Villafranca, leaving the north of Italy still in the hands of the detested foreigner. The Italians cried out against the French emperor for deserting them after having declared that he would free Italy "from the Alps to the Adriatic." They forgot that only for his assistance Austria might have crushed them to powder, as she had already done during the reign of Charles Albert. Napoleon made peace with Austria because he was afraid of Prussia, who was afterwards to become his conqueror.

There was another conservative force in Europe which Napo-

leon III. should have kept friendly at all hazards: that was the Papacy. Its temporal power was the oldest sovereignty in Europe, guaranteed by the law of nations. It represented law and right. It represented the great Catholic party of France and the world. It stood in the way of the ambition of the subalpine kingdom, ever grasping and aggressive, and plotting the overthrow of all the other Italian principalities for the pretended cause of Italian unity, but really for the sake of Sardinian domination. Napoleon should have seen that Italian unity meant the creation of a great force hostile to France on the south, as Prussia was hostile to her on the east. But he seemed to be dazed. The blindness of his uncle fell on him. The uncle had tried to get rid of the *vieux calotin*, Pius VII., and the nephew tried to get rid of his namesake, Pius IX. Both broke their power on the same rock. The curse of Rome followed them and their armies, the one to the Borodino and Moscow, the other to the Rhine and Sedan.

Napoleon became more unprincipled as he grew older. He fell under the domination of the subalpine clique, more especially after the marriage of his cousin Prince Jerome to the daughter of Victor Emmanuel. So it was decreed that the pope's temporality should first be sacrificed after the kingdom of Naples had been abolished. Napoleon wrote to Pius IX. letters signed "Your devoted son," expressing his anxiety for the papal welfare, and sent words of sympathy to the King of Naples, holding out hopes of aid to him, while at the same time he was tolerating or secretly encouraging Cavour and Garibaldi to destroy the temporal power of both. Lamoricière, the pope's general, asserted that he had the word of Napoleon for it that the Piedmontese army should not be allowed to interfere at Castel Fidardo. King Ferdinand had his promise of non-interference at Gaeta. But the word and the promise were of a true Corsican. The Italian general, Cialdini, told Lamoricière at Castel Fidardo that he had seen the emperor and was sure of his sympathy.

With the fall of the papal sovereignty Napoleon lost the sympathy of all the Catholics in France and in the world. He never had the full sympathy of the infidel body, and so when he surrendered at Sedan no one wept for his fate. Before that event came, however, he was to commit more blunders, one of which made him as detestable to Americans as he had become to the best classes in European society.

This blunder was the expedition to Mexico. It was the less excusable because Napoleon, having lived for some time in our

country, ought to have known that his interference in the affairs of this continent would be resented. In virtue of the Monroe doctrine we are jealous of European interference in our own or in the affairs of our neighbors. Our national sympathies are with republics and democracies everywhere, but especially in America. Napoleon knew that he would alienate the feelings of all the inhabitants of the United States by taking advantage of our civil dissensions to attempt to erect an empire at our very doors. His sympathy for the Southern rebellion created a bitter feeling against him in the North. His effort to destroy the Mexican republic and turn it into an empire under an Austrian prince intensified our hostility to him and his dynasty. Even if he had succeeded in realizing his foolish dream of a Latin empire in Mexico it could not have lasted. We would have crushed it so soon as our civil war would have been over. This state of feeling in the United States Napoleon himself perhaps knew; but, with his usual weakness, he allowed himself to be influenced by the royalist Spanish *camarilla* that so often controlled his court. Labastida, the exiled archbishop of Mexico, full of resentment against the republic, is said to have used his influence with the empress, and both, together with Juan Prim, of Spain, engineered the plot to turn Mexico into an empire. Labastida's motive was probably the interest of his own party; Prim expected to be made emperor himself; and Napoleon's vanity was stimulated by the project. It seemed easy to be realized while the power of the United States was divided by the civil war. On the 30th November, 1861, France, England, and Spain agreed to interfere in the domestic affairs of Mexico. The French army, sent across the Atlantic at enormous expense, was decimated by disease. France was robbed by the expedition. Prim, perceiving that he was not to be the emperor, induced Spain to desert, and England, selfish and cunning, left Napoleon to carry out the scheme alone. Bazaine, a name since Metz infamous in France, was the agent, and Maximilian the victim, of this unfortunate undertaking. The result of it is well known. The United States threatened; Juarez held out; France withdrew, and Maximilian, one of the bravest names that ever gave glory to the house of Hapsburg, was left to fight his battle alone. He died like a hero, shot by the republican soldiers of Juarez at Queretaro on July 19, 1867—almost on the anniversary of the battle of Waterloo. His death was a second Waterloo for the Bonaparte family, for from it broke out that feeling of hatred in Austria, and that feeling of contempt in France and

throughout the world, which culminated in execration after the surrender of Sedan.

Austria never forgave the interview between Maximilian's wife, Carlotta, and Napoleon III. in a hotel at Paris previous to the fall of her husband. She begged Bonaparte not to desert him, telling him that it would be dishonorable to do so. She threw herself at his feet as a suppliant, but in vain. "It is useless to insist, madame," said the cold-blooded son of Hortense. "I shall not give your husband another man, not another crown." The words broke her heart and disordered her brain. She rose to her feet, and with flashing eyes, from which shot the fires of incipient insanity, exclaimed: "Ah! I was not, then, deceived in you. I know you, destroyer of my family! You have your revenge on the granddaughter of Louis Philippe, who saved you from misery and the scaffold." She followed him to the door as he departed, crying after him: "You think you can, through your police, tear from me your letters and promises; but you are mistaken. They are secure. Go! and may the curse of God fall on you as on Cain!"

She lost her reason, and the curse fell on the betrayer of Maximilian. As the ghost of Cæsar haunted Brutus at Philippi, so did the vision of Maximilian's bloody corse and the shadow of his insane wife haunt Napoleon at Sedan.

Step by step the crisis was approaching. The Catholic party alienated by his treachery to the pope; England and Russia both distrustful; the conservatives of Italy unfriendly on account of his having betrayed the exiled sovereign of Naples; the radicals of Italy discontented by the abrupt treaty of Villafranca; Austria hostile on account of the Italian war and his desertion of Maximilian; the United States unfriendly on account of his Mexican enterprise and because of his well-known sympathy for the Southern rebellion; Prussia watching the game and making ready for the inevitable struggle: how stood France to Napoleon?

The secret societies to which the emperor had belonged, and to please which he had betrayed the pope and attacked Austria, still continued to plot. Their motto was nationality and an international republic. By nationality they meant a union of the people of the same race in spite of geographical, financial, or municipal reasons. By internationalism they meant socialism and communism. True nationality, like true liberty, is based on the preservation of municipal rights and is opposed to centralization. Our form of government, with its system of separate States, each preserving its own peculiar privileges, serving as a

check to centralized uniformity ; or Switzerland with its distinct cantons ; or the confederation of the Italian States, each retaining its own constitution and laws, as advocated by Gioberti ; or the Spanish system, in which some of the provinces retain their own customs and *fueros*, would not satisfy the advocates of national unity. They wanted a geographical, legal, and centralized nationality, which could be moved from one extreme to another, as an electric current is set in motion by the touch of a button under the thumb of one executive. They wanted, not a nationality like a mosaic, with variety in unity, but a nationality vulgarly uniform. Prince Jerome was the friend and protector of all these dreamers and schemers, while at the same time he held relations with all his cousin's theories regarding the perpetuity of the Napoleonic dynasty. Indeed, it was in the interest of this cause that he courted the socialists and publicly seemed to favor the *Internationale* while the emperor was prosecuting it. Both imagined that, despite the opposition of Legitimists and Orleanists, they could at last found a liberal Napoleonic dynasty on the support of the irreligious masses. They imagined that they could make the Commune content with a liberal empire, and cheat the people out of their desire to re-establish the republic. But they counted without Gambetta, Favre, and Rochefort. They did not expect that Pierre Bonaparte was going to murder Victor Noir, one of the idols of the Parisian mob. They forgot that the more the tiger of communism gets the more he wants. They forgot that the empire had lost its hold on the French heart, and that Bismarck knew it. Rouher and the old Bonapartists saw the chasm into which the emperor was going to plunge ; but he would not listen to them. He preferred the counsels of his quondam enemy, the demagogue Emile Olivier, to those of his tried friend, Rouher ; and he trusted Le Bœuf, the imbecile Minister of War, rather than Niel and MacMahon, the true victors of Solferino and Magenta. Honest Niel was dead ; MacMahon was in quasi-exile in Africa. Thiers' advice would not be listened to. Bismarck was ready. Prussia was armed and longing for the fray. France was rich, but the administration of civil affairs had become corrupt and the nerves of discipline, both in the army and the navy, were fatally relaxed.

We now reach the last act in this emperor's reign, one that began in such splendor and ended in such disgrace. We saw in the beginning the genius of Cavour leading him into the blunder of the Italian campaign, the result of which was to raise up on the southern frontier of France a rival power discontented with

the half-measures of Villafranca. We shall now see a German statesman lead Napoleon to ruin at Sedan. Bismarck, like Cavour and Napoleon, belongs to the Machiavellian school of politics. Hatred of France and of everything French had been instilled into King William's mind from his very infancy, and detestation of the Napoleons was with him almost a monomania. Bismarck was a strange agent for this royal son of Luther, half fanatic in his Protestantism and half savage in his policy, to choose. Yet the pair have ever worked harmoniously, the king calling on Providence, while the minister called on his Uhlans and his rifled cannon, to carry out the policy of deception, of blood and iron, which was to enlarge the Prussian kingdom into an empire and humiliate France. Bismarck played his game astutely. He helped Cavour to gain Italian unity, in order to weaken Austria and create sympathy for Prussian aims beyond the Pyrenees, and then he duped Napoleon into non-interference in the war with Austria.

It is not probable that Bismarck at first hoped or intended to take Alsace-Lorraine from France. His aim was to drive the Austrian influence out of North Germany and leave it entirely under Prussian hegemony. But he could not do this without the leave of France. In order, therefore, to gain the sympathy of the latter he paid court to Napoleon, and in 1862 submitted to him a plan for the reorganization of Europe. The chief points of it were that France was to annex Luxembourg and Belgium, and afterwards the coal districts on the Rhine of Saar and Mentz. Prussia, in return for helping France to this piece of territory, was to get control of Hanover and all the German states as far south as the Main. He flattered, coaxed, bribed, and intrigued at the court in Paris and Biarritz, till Napoleon, weak and mute, allowed him to carry out his scheme. Napoleon perhaps thought that after the expulsion of Austrian influence from Schleswig-Holstein, and the breaking of her power at Sadowa, Bismarck would keep his word. It is strange that such an adept in duplicity as Napoleon should have trusted a man like Bismarck. But the sybarite who presided over the destinies of France was every day growing weaker and weaker. In 1866 Prussia declared war on Austria. Napoleon even then could have dictated terms to Bismarck. He could have at once pushed his army to the Rhine, which old Frederick II. said was the natural eastern limit of France. Both Prussia and Austria would have been obliged to assent. They were at war with each other. But the opportunity was lost, and after the Prussian victory at Sadowa

it was no longer possible for France to dictate terms. Bismarck was allowed to achieve the work of Prussian aggrandizement without let or hindrance. The Prussian chancellor himself expressed surprise at the stupidity of the French emperor. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and gallant Marshal Niel tried to awake him to his danger and exact from Bismarck, while it was possible, some compensation to France for her friendly neutrality. But in vain. When the last scene in his inglorious reign opened Niel and Drouyn de Lhuys were dead.

On the 15th of July, 1870, the French parliament decreed war against Prussia, exactly four years too late. Rouher and the old imperial counsellors had been superseded by men like Olivier and Le Bœuf. The emperor had yielded up many of his prerogatives and relaxed his hold on the French people. He thought that the liberal constitution would reconcile them to his dynasty. A war with Prussia for refusing to give France the Rhine as a boundary would distract the attention of France, and, if it were successful, would make it forgive his Mexican and Italian mistakes. Success, of course, he expected. He always believed in his star. In a few months after a rapid march on Berlin he would return with spoil and glory, the conqueror of the victor of Sadowa. Prussian insolence, that had dared to favor the candidacy of a Hohenzollern for the Spanish throne, was to be punished at Berlin by the nephew, as it had been punished at Jena by the uncle. Yet suddenly it was found that nothing was ready. Luxury had destroyed the discipline of the French army. A veritable reign of "shoddy" pervaded all the departments of the administration. Theft and imbecility were found everywhere. The commissariat was defective. The quota of the regiments was not filled. The officers did not know the geography of their own country. They had not even the maps necessary to study it. Yet all seemed right on paper. M. Le Bœuf, Minister of War, said that France was ready, that she did not need to buy even a gaiter-button. He said that there was a stock on hand of four millions of chassepot rifles; in reality there were but eleven hundred. There was a powerful French navy, which Prussia especially dreaded, for it could have blockaded her Baltic ports and landed a force on her northern frontier. But the navy, commanded by Rigault de Genouilly—another product of this reign of shoddy—had no proper charts of the Baltic, and did absolutely nothing during the campaign. The administration in France had seen the growth of Prussia, her magnificent

army and its splendid equipment, its thorough discipline and great prestige, especially after the victory of Sadowa; yet no proper preparations had been made for the struggle that every one saw to be inevitable. The most bitter satire that was ever penned against French vanity is not half so strong as the record of the battles in Napoleon's last war, from Wörth and Forbach to Metz and Sedan. "On to Berlin!" was the cry of the whole French people when Napoleon left Paris. They believed in the prestige of French arms. They could not believe that the emperor was an absolute imbecile. They thought that all was ready, but the answer to their cry was the harsh "*Nach Paris!*" of the Uhlans. German sobriety, steadiness, discipline, and poverty trampled down in the dust the luxury, volatility, and licentiousness of the administration of the last of the Napoleons. The corrupt officers of his army, debauched by Mexican wealth, Parisian effeminacy, and government appointments irrespective of merit, were no match for the sinewy sons of Bavaria and the brawny braves of Brandenburg. France, still crippled and humiliated, will never forgive the disgrace of her last defeat, due to the neglect and blindness of her emperor. The defeat at Sedan on the 2d of September, 1870, ended the Napoleonic dynasty.

The man is dead, but his work survives him. The present republic is a fit sequel to an empire begotten in perjury and nurtured in deception. The charlatanism of the present leaders of French diplomatic thought, of Gambetta and Ferry, is but the fruit of Napoleon's failure to set France on the road to real greatness, to progress based on truth, honor, self-restraint, and religion.

Yet perhaps we should make some allowances for his shortcomings. His moral education was bad, owing to the corrupt surroundings of his youth. He was taught to be a Catholic rather because Catholicity was the religion of his family than on account of the fixed principles and strict practices which it entails. His only fixed belief was in his star, in his destiny. The government of Louis Philippe is accused of having purposely given him opportunities of debauch in the prison at Ham. His physical and mental debility manifested after his escape give probability to the story. He was a bundle of contradictions, a model of duplicity. He called himself a devout Catholic and acted like a free-thinker; a son of the church, yet a Carbonaro; and although a Frenchman by descent, he was a Corsican in insincerity and a Hollander in phlegm. His cold character, so unlike that of his un-

cle, caused many to doubt his legitimacy. His public policy was tortuous, shuffling, Machiavellian. Perhaps at no period of history does the contrast appear more striking between it and true Christian diplomacy than during his reign. Palmerston, Cavour, Bismarck, and Napoleon III., aiming at success by systematic lying and deception, making the end always justify the means, were incarnate representatives of Machiavelli's system.

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